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The introduction of a series of regulations on equity incentives since the launch 
of Tentative Methods for Equity Incentives of Listed Companies in 2006 has further 
standardized China’s listed companies’ equity incentive practice. As the legal system 
improved and China’s IPO procedure accelerated, the year 2010 and 2011 witnessed a 
growing trend of equity incentive plans launched by listed companies. Whether these  
plans, which claim to bind the interests of management and shareholders, will bring 
abnormal returns to investors as expected, and whether the compulsory performance 
requirements will improve the incentive and tied mechanism as the authorities expects? 
This paper seeks answers to the above questions from the point of CAR. 
In order to research into the abnormal returns brought by the announcement of 
equity incentive plans and the impact of performance requirements on CAR, we’ve 
sampled all listed companies that made initial announcements of incentive plans from 
2010 to 2011, made empirical tests on CAR in different time windows around the 
announcement day, and analyzed the relations between the strictness of performance 
requirements and CAR in the method of multiple linear regression. Meanwhile, we 
also tested the impact of other elements in incentive plans on CAR, such as subject 
type of incentives, percentage of shares given by the incentive plans, validity of the 
plans and whether chairmen of the board are included as objects of the plans. 
Our empirical findings suggest that, first, announcement of equity incentive 
plans does bring abnormal returns, but insider dealers would always buy the shares in 
advance, resulting in a sharp decrease in profits gained by common investors; second, 
the stricter the performance requirements of incentive plans, the more CAR it 
generates around the announcement day; third, stock options has a more significant 
spur on prices than restricted shares. However, other elements such as percentage of 
shares granted in the incentive plans, validity of the plans and whether chairmen of 
the board are included as objects have no significant effect on CAR. 
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了股权激励方案。由此导致 2010 年和 2011 年公告股权激励计划的上市公司数量








































置改革的完成，监管当局于 2006 年至 2009 年先后推出了《上市公司股权激励管
理办法（试行）》、《股权激励有关事项备忘录》1-3 号、《创业板信息披露备忘录
第 8 号：股权激励（股票期权）》和《创业板信息披露备忘录第 9 号：股权激励
（限制性股票）》，制度环境处在不断完善的过程中，并且与前几年相比应该有所
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